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AN ANALYSIS OF THE GRADUAL EROSION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT REGARDING VOLUNTARY THIRD PARTY
CONSENT SEARCHES: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the warrantless entry of a person's home, whether to make an arrest or to
conduct a search.1 This prohibition does not apply, however, to situa-
tions where voluntary consent to enter the premises has been obtained,
either from the individual who owns the property, 2 or from a third party
who possesses common authority over the premises.3
The purpose of this Note is to address the current law in the area of
warrantless searches, in light of recent United States Supreme Court and
North Dakota Supreme Court decisions. Specifically, this Note will
address third party consent searches and the limitations, if any, that exist
in this area. To understand the scope of Fourth Amendment protections
in the area of consent searches, this Note begins with an analysis of the
United States Constitution and the correlating sections of the North
Dakota Constitution.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
As originally proposed, the United States Constitution had only a
few provisions relating to the administration of criminal law. 4 However,
as time passed, the Framers realized the need to expand these provisions
by adopting a Bill of Rights, designed to ensure that the federal govern-
ment did not encroach upon the liberty of its citizens. 5 As a result,
extensive constitutional regulation of the criminal justice system devel-
oped. 6
1. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (concluding that "[aibsent exigent
circumstances," the threshold of an individual's home "may not reasonably be crossed without a
warrant").
2. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (concluding that consenting to a
search validates a warrantless search under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments if the subject of
the search gave the consent voluntarily).
3. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169 (1974) (determining that where two or more
people have joint access to. or control of the premises, it is reasonable that any of the co-inhabitants
has the right to permit the inspection in his or her own right and that the others have assumed the risk
that one of them might permit a search of the common area).
4. Id. at 181 n.1 (citing 2 JOHN ADAMS, WORKS 524) (covering the debates on the Constitution prior
to the passage of the Bill of Rights).
5. Id. at 182 n.1 (citing I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434-35) (recording the debate of the First
Congress on the proposed amendments to the United States Constitution).
6. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Such regulation included an amendment disallowing the form of
oppressive search and seizure best known by the British colonists as the
general warrant. 7 Under British rule, the general warrant allowed offi-
cials of the Crown to search all places and for everything in a specific
place, limited only by the officials' discretion. 8 Consequently, the
colonists and the Framers of the United States Constitution sought to
protect citizens from searches lacking warrants. 9 Therefore, when the
Bill of Rights was eventually ratified, the Fourth Amendment was among
the protections assuring prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 10
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
In its final form, the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution ensures that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
The protections incorporated into the Fourth Amendment are
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.12 However, at both federal and state levels, the Fourth
Amendment only governs conduct by agents of the government.1 3 In
this context, agents of the government include police, other government
7. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 313-17 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
8. Warden, 387 U.S. at 313-17.
9. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 183 n.1 (1974) (citing 2 Jom ADAMS, WORKS 524)
(condemning the general warrant while envisioning acceptable alternatives).
10. Id. (citing SENATE JOURNAL, August 25, 1789).
11. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The same language was initially codified in 1889 in the North
Dakota Constitution. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 18. This language has since been codified in N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
12. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (stating that the "[Fourth] Amendment's
proscriptions are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment"); Wolf v. People of
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (stating that "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police . . . is implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment).
13. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (stating that "the principles laid down in
this opinion ... apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employ[ee]s of the sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies of life"); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914)
(stating that "[tihe effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal
officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise
of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and
effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law").
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employees, and private persons acting at the direction or request of
government officials, but not private citizens. 14
Under the language of the United States Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment specifically provides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause." 15 This requires that a valid arrest or search warrant be
based on an affidavit or complaint, which sets forth facts establishing the
requisite requirement of probable cause. 16  However, if an arrest or
search is conducted without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment requires
that it must not be "unreasonable."17
C. PRESUMPTION OF WARRANTS
Although there are many circumstances where arrests and searches
may be made without a warrant, the Supreme Court has indicated that it
is more likely to uphold an arrest or a search that is accompanied by a
valid warrant. 18 This preference is based on the warrant process itself
since a warrant will only be issued after a neutral and detached magis-
trate determines it is valid.19 Therefore, officers engaged in the competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime are not allowed to make hurried
decisions which would be reviewable by a magistrate only after the fact
and by hindsight judgment. 20 Although mistakes may still be made
14. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (stating that "[t]he Fourth Amendment
gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and ... its protection applies to governmental
action"). The Court further stated that the origin and history of the Fourth Amendment "clearly show
that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended" to
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies. Id.
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant text of the Fourth
Amendment).
16. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (stating that an officer must have a warrant based
upon probable cause in order for an arrest to be constitutionally valid).
17. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant text of the Fourth
Amendment). See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471,479 (1963) (stating that "whether or
not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which an officer may act are
more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent than where an
arrest warrant is obtained"); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) (stating that absent
a warrant, probable cause will still be required).
18. See supra note I and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
entry into a person's home without a warrant).
19. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972). The Court stated that an issuing
magistrate must meet two tests. Id. First, the magistrate must be neutral and detached. Id. Second,
the magistrate must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest
or search. Id. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ...subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions"); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102. 108 (1965) (stating that
affidavits for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a common
sense and realistic fashion).
20. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
110-11 (1964). The Court stated that "an evaluation of the constitutionality of a search warrant should
begin with the rule that 'the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue
warrants ...are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers .. .who may happen to make
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within the warrant process, it at least has the advantage of providing a
before-the-fact record of the facts upon which probable cause is based.21
The Fourth Amendment further provides that no warrants shall issue
except those "particularly describing the place to be searched." 22 This
means that the description must be such that the executing officer can
identify the place with reasonable effort. 23 Such specificity will be
overlooked and a warrant will not be required, however, when valid
consent is given to a search of the premises in question. 24
D. VALID CONSENT Is AN EXCEPTION To WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Where an individual gives valid consent,25 a search of his or her
person or property may be conducted without a warrant and without
probable cause. 26 Such a search will only be upheld, however, if the
consent is deemed voluntary. 27
arrests."' Id. The Court also stated that, "although the reviewing court will pay substantial deference
to judicial determinations of probable cause, the court must still insist that the magistrate perform his
'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Id. at 111.
21. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (stating that "[t]he rule of probable
cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law
enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim
or caprice.").
22. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (quoting the text of the Fourth Amendment).
23. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). The requirement of a particular
description and location is for the benefit of the suspect. See id. at 501. If it appears that the property
taken is not the same as that described in the warrant, or that there is no probable cause to believe the
grounds on which the warrant was issued, the judge or commissioner must return the property to the
person from whom it was taken. Id.
24. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (stating that a warrant is not needed when consent is
voluntary). Note, however, that valid consent is not the only exception to the warrant requirement.
See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985)
(stating other exceptions to the warrant requirement). Professor Bradley tallied a total of 22
exceptions as of 1985. Id. Currently, the list of exceptions also includes, but is not limited to:
automobile searches, searches incident to arrest, plain view seizures, and "exigent circumstances"
searches. Id. For cases corresponding to these examples, see collectively: Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (upholding the warrantless search of an automobile in order to preserve
evidence, since the car could have been driven out of the jurisdiction before the officers could obtain
a warrant); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (allowing the police to search the area
within the defendant's immediate control after a lawful arrest, in order to protect the police and
prevent destruction of evidence); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (noting that
police may seize evidence that is in plain view from a place where they are lawfully entitled to be);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (determining that hot pursuit is an exigent
circumstance justifying entry of a dwelling without a warrant when police have probable cause to
believe that evidence may be lost or destroyed).
25. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (determining that valid express or
implied consent, for Fourth Amendment purposes, permits police to conduct an otherwise possibly
forbidden search or seizure at the premises in question).
26. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624
(1946)) (stating that a warrantless search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally
permissible).
27. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243.
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The voluntariness of a consent search is determined from the totality of
the circumstances. 28 However, even if consent is given voluntarily, the
subsequent search by the police may not exceed the physical bounds of
the area to which consent applied. 29
The standard for determining the scope of consent is "objective
reasonableness." 30 Objective reasonableness requires that a law enforce-
ment official ask him or herself what the typical, reasonable person
would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect.31 If the officer can reasonably conclude that the suspect con-
sented, then the search may proceed. 32 This same standard also applies
to situations where a valid third party gives consent to search the premis-
es while the suspect is not present.
E. VALID THIRD PARTY CONSENT Is ANOTHER EXCEPTION
In the area of consent searches, courts have long recognized that
certain third parties, with the required authority, may also give consent to
permit seized evidence to be used against an absent individual. 33 Such
authority may be labeled as either common, actual, or apparent authori-
28. Id. at 223. In determining whether a defendant's consent was voluntary, the Court has
assessed the totality of the surrounding circumstances, looking at both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation. Id. at 226. Soine of the factors taken into account have
included: the youth of the accused, lack of education of the accused, low intelligence of the accused,
the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, and the length of detention of the
accused. Id. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (considering the youth of the
accused); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (considering the education of the accused);
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196 (1957) (considering the intelligence of the accused); Davis v.
North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-42 (1966) (considering the constitutional rights of the accused);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 231 (1940) (considering the detention of the accused).
29. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). The facts in Jimeno revolved around a search
of the defendant's automobile which led to the seizure of a kilogram of cocaine discovered in a paper
bag in the back seat. Id. Jimeno claimed that when he consented to a search of the automobile, he
was only granting general consent which did not extend to containers found within the automobile. Id.
However, the Court determined that, although a suspect may delimit the scope of a search as he
chooses, a general consent to search an automobile for drugs could reasonably include searching the
contents of a paper bag located in the backseat. Id. at 251. See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 821-22 (1982) (concluding that the scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed
object).
30. Jimeno. 500 U.S. at 251 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89 (1990)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See United States v. Matlock 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (finding that consent may be given by
a third party who possesses common authority over the area to be searched); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 179 (1990) (finding that, when based on the facts available, an officer could reasonably
believe that there was consent). Matlock reaffirmed that a warrantless entry and search by law
enforcement officers does not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable
searches and seizures" if the officers have obtained the consent of a third party who possesses
common authority over the premises. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171. In Rodriguez, this was extended to
warrantless entry based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry,
reasonably believed to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact did not.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179.
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ty.34 As will be discussed, cases dealing with third party consent are
responsible for significant erosion of individual Fourth Amendment
rights. With each decision, the Fourth Amendment is gradually eaten
away, small bites leading to large consequences.
II. THE EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
RELATING TO CONSENT SEARCHES AND DEFENDANTS'
RIGHTS
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Since its inception, Fourth Amendment search and seizure law has
encountered notable change. While initial decisions emphasized defen-
dants' rights, later cases have given more power to law enforcement
bodies. As a result, the protections of the Fourth Amendment have
deteriorated. This gradual decline has produced a modified Fourth
Amendment which retains the original language, but fails to deliver the
protection it was intended to guarantee.
In particular, third party consent has done significant damage to the
Fourth Amendment. Through such consent, an individual's privacy
may be legally invaded by someone else. This invasion occurs without a
warrant and without probable cause, both of which are mandated by the
Fourth Amendment. 35 The following discussion outlines the progression
the federal courts have taken to establish third party consent, and exam-
ines how the results of these decisions will affect future defendants.
1. Consent Searches Evolve Under The Concept Of Waiver
Initially, the consent doctrine was based on the concept of waiver. 36
This theory came about in 1964 with the decision of Stoner v. Califor-
nia.37 In Stoner, the Court held that Fourth Amendment rights can only
be waived by the defendant, by word or deed, either directly or through
an agent. 38
34. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 35, 96 (6th ed. 1991) (defining actual or common authority as
"[the power of an agent to bind its principle where such power derives either from express or implied
agreement between the principle and the agent"; defining apparent authority as "such authority as a
reasonably prudent man, using diligence and discretion, in view of the principal's conduct, would
naturally suppose the agent to possess").
35. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (providing the text of the Fourth Amendment).
36. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (articulating an agency theory in the area of
consent searches that required a defendant, or his or her agent, to directly waive Fourth Amendment
Protections).
37. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
38. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489. In Stoner, a checkbook stub belonging to the defendant, an alleged
bank robber, led police officers to the hotel where he was staying in Pomona, California. Id. at 484.
Upon arrival, the officers questioned the hotel's night clerk as to the whereabouts of Mr. Stoner. Id. at
[VOL. 72:99
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On review, the Court denied the State's contention that a hotel
clerk's consent was valid against a guest, by emphasizing that the rights
ensured by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by "strained
applications" of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of appar-
ent authority. 39 Consequently, the Court determined that a police
officer's mistaken reliance as to someone's legal authority could not, in
effect, expand the limits of third party consent since it was unreasonable
and wholly outside the realm of the Fourth Amendment.
40
2. Consent Searches Allow For A Property Theory
Four years later, in Bumper v. North Carolina,41 the Court went
beyond the theory of agency and concluded that the law of property
could also determine valid consent. 42 In this case, the Court denied
officers the use of a third party's consent to a search which recovered an
incriminating rifle because consent was granted only after the officers
had informed the party that they had a search warrant. 43 The Court
concluded that a search conducted in reliance upon a warrant could not
later be justified on the basis of consent if it turned out the warrant was
invalid or was never produced at trial.44
485. The night clerk informed the officers that Mr. Stoner was not in the hotel at that time. Id.
The officers then advised the clerk that Mr. Stoner was an alleged bank robber who may be
concealing dangerous weapons in his room. Id. Based on this information, the night clerk gave
consent for the officers to search Mr. Stoner's room. Id. The search revealed the following items
from the robbery: horn-rimmed glasses, a gray jacket, and a .45-caliber automatic pistol with a clip
and several cartridges. Id. at 485-86. Consequently, Mr. Stoner was arrested and charged with
robbery two days later. Id. at 486.
39. Id. at 488.
40. Id. See also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (finding that while a hotel guest
undoubtedly gives implied or express permission to such persons as maids, janitors, or repairman, this
permission does not extend to hotel clerks and police officers); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,
79-80 (1949) (concluding that the manager of a hotel could not allow police to enter and search a
room without a warrant in the occupant's absence).
41. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
42. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.l 1 (1968). In Bumper, the defendant lived
with his African American grandmother in a house located in a rural area of North Carolina. Id. at
546. Two days after the defendant allegedly committed a rape, but prior to his arrest, four white law
enforcement officers went to his house to conduct a search of the premises. Id. Upon their arrival,
they were met at the front door by the defendant's grandmother, Mrs. Leath. Id.
The officers proceeded to inform Mrs. Leath that they had a search warrant, and as a result,
she allowed them to enter the house. Id. While searching, the officers discovered a rifle that was
later used to help convict the defendant of rape. Id. Although Mrs. Leath testified at trial that she let
the officers search of her own free will, they never showed her the warrant they purported to have.
Id. at 547. During the course of the proceedings, the Court was advised that the searching officers did
have a warrant. Id. at 550 n.15. However, no warrant was ever returned, and there was no way of
knowing the conditions under which it was raised, or whether it was based on probable cause. Id.
43. Id. at 549.
44. Id. at 549-50. The Court further stated, "when a law enforcement officer claims authority to
search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search." Id. at 550.
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Although the Court refused to validate the consent in Bumper, it
determined that if the third party had voluntarily acquiesced to a search
of the premises, without being told of a warrant, the resulting search
would have been binding upon the defendant. 45 The rationale behind
this conclusion was that the consenting third party owned both the house
and the rifle.46 Furthermore, all members of the household used the rifle
and it was found in the common area of the house. 47 Consequently, the
Fourth Amendment was no longer confined to the barriers of agency
alone as it had expanded to also incorporate ownership rights. The
gradual erosion of individual rights had begun.
3. Assumption Of The Risk
The Supreme Court revisited the consent doctrine two years later in
Frazier v. Cupp.48 In Frazier, the Court ruled that the consent of
Frazier's cousin to the search of a duffel bag, which both men used
jointly and had been left in the cousin's home, was valid to justify the
seizure of Frazier's clothing found inside. 49 Furthermore, the Court
failed to find credence in Frazier's argument that his cousin only had
permission to use one compartment within the bag.50
As a result, this decision expanded the property theory in Bumper
by incorporating a new theory termed assumption of the risk. 51 In its
conclusion, the Court determined that by allowing his cousin the use of
the bag, and by leaving it in his home, Frazier assumed the risk that his
cousin may allow someone else to look inside. 52 Accordingly, the Court
held that the joint use of the bag validated the cousin's authority to
consent to its search. 53
Based on the holding in Frazier, assumption of the risk extends to
any property or space which two or more individuals share. Since the
Fourth Amendment is intended to protect a single individual from
unreasonable searches, it appears that the Court took another step to limit
45. Id. at 548 n.l1.
46. Id.
47. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 n.l 1.
48. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). Frazier was convicted of second degree murder in Oregon. Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 732 (1969). He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was
granted by the District Court of Oregon. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Id.
Frazier had been indicted jointly with his cousin, who plead guilty to the charge of second degree
murder. Id. at 733.
49. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740.
50. Id.
51. Id. Assumption of the risk is when two persons have equal rights to the use or occupation of
premises, either may give consent to a search, and the evidence disclosed can be used against either.
United States v. Skally, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir. 1954).




the protections of the Fourth Amendment by allowing a third party to
speak for an individual in his or her absence. Following this decision, a
defendant had no voice against law enforcement officials if he or she
shared property, space, or a duffel bag with another.
4. Consent To Search Must Be Voluntary/Knowledge of
Refusal Unnecessary
Four years later, in Schneckloth v. Bustamante,54 the Court further
limited the protection of the Fourth Amendment by reaffirming the
principle that the search of property, without a warrant and without
probable cause, but with voluntary third party consent, is valid under the
Fourth Amendment. 55 The Court further ruled that it is not essential for
the prosecution to show that a defendant knew of his or her right to
refuse consent in order to establish that the consent was voluntary. 56
In Schneckloth, the Court considered whether incriminating evi-
dence could be used against the defendant as the result of a third party's
consent to a search of the vehicle the parties were occupying. 57 The
Court upheld the search since the consentor was not coerced nor under a
submission to authority, even though the consentor did not know he
could refuse the search. 58 As a result, this decision further eroded
Fourth Amendment protections by failing to require that defendants be
informed that they can refuse or limit a search request.59
54. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
55. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
56. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
57. Id. at 220. The evidence against Schneckloth was discovered in the course of a routine
traffic stop. Id. A police officer pulled the vehicle over because one headlight and the license plate
light were burnt out. id. When only one of the six people in the vehicle could produce identification,
the officer asked to conduct a search of the vehicle. Id. The owner's brother consented to the
search. Id. In the course of the search, the officer discovered three checks that had previously been
stolen from a car wash wadded up under the back seat. Id. Based on this and other evidence,
Schneckloth was convicted of possessing a check with the intent to defraud. Id.
Thereafter, Schneckloth sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Id. at 221.
The writ was denied and Schneckloth appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Id. The appellate court reasoned
that consent was a waiver of a person's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the State must
prove: first, that the consent was uncoerced, and second, that it was given with an understanding that
it could be freely and effectively withheld. Id. at 222. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed
since the party that consented did not know he could have withheld his consent. Id.
58. Id. at 248.
59. Id. at 226. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated: "It wholly escapes me how our citizens can
meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever
being aware of its existence." Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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5. Common Authority Prevails Over A Warrant
One year after Schneckloth, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Matlock,60 considered how personal relationships affect third party
consent situations.61 In its analysis, the Court ruled that where two or
more people have joint access to, or control of the premises, it is reason-
able to recognize that either or any of them has the right to permit a
search of his or her possessions, and that the others have assumed the
risk that one may permit the common area to be searched. 62 Therefore,
the Court held that the consent of one who possesses common authority
over premises or its effects is valid against the absent, nonconsenting
person with whom that authority is shared.63
However, Justice Douglas's dissent opined that the absence of a
search warrant, where authorities had the opportunity to obtain one,
should have been fatal to the search in this case since there was adequate
time to obtain a warrant and there was no emergency for which a warrant
could be bypassed. 64 Justice Douglas further stated that the third party's
permission for the police to invade the house provided an inadequate
60. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
61. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974). In this case, Matlock was indicted for
bank robbery based on a consent search of his home that revealed evidence of the crime. Id. The
indictment was the result of a 1971 robbery that had occurred at a federally insured bank in
Wisconsin. Id. He subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence claiming that his girlfriend's
consent to the search was invalid. Id.
The facts of the case showed that the home in which Matlock lived was leased by Mr. and Mrs.
Marshall. Id. Matlock was living in the home with Mrs. Marshall, and several of her children.
including her daughter Gayle Graff who was Matlock's girlfriend. Id. Although the officers were
aware that Matlock lived in the house, they did not ask him which room was his or whether he would
consent to a search. Id. Instead, the officers were admitted into the house after Matlock's arrest by
his girlfriend's voluntary consent. Id.
As was noted by Justice Douglas in his dissent, the officers searched the house on three
separate occasions. Id. at 179. The first search occurred when Mrs. Graff consented to the officers'
search of the bedroom she and Matlock shared. Id. The officers then left the house, but returned a
short time later to resume the search. Id. This time the officers found incriminating evidence in the
pantry area of the house. Id. The third search was conducted later in the afternoon, when the
officers relied upon Mrs. Marshall's consent to search the downstairs area of the house, including
Matlock's dresser. Id. At no time did the officers secure a warrant. Id. Once inside, the officers
discovered money and a gun related to the robbery. Id. at 166.
At the time of the search, Mrs. Graff told the officers that she and Matlock occupied the east
bedroom together. Id. at 175. She also stated that she and Matlock shared the only dresser in the room
and that they had slept together in the room. Id. at 175-76. Mrs. Graff's statements were believable
because they were against her penal interest, since cohabitating without the benefit of marriage was
illegal in Wisconsin at this time. Id. at 176. Therefore, Mrs. Graff's voluntary consent to search the
east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant admitting into evidence the $4,995 found in the diaper
bag. Id. at 177.
62. Id. At 177. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (defining assumption of risk).
63. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (defining common
authority).
64. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 178. Justice Douglas also stated that the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment carefully and explicitly restricting the circumstances in which warrants can issue and the
breadth of searches have become "empty phrases," when the Court sanctions such a search
conducted without any effort by the police to secure a valid search warrant. Id. at 187.
108
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substitute for the protections which inhere in a judicially granted war-
rant.65 Nevertheless, the majority prevailed and after Matlock, the
protection previously afforded by the Fourth Amendment could be
bypassed by an independent party in the defendant's absence. 66
6. Revisiting The Law Of Agency To Determine Consent
In United States v. Baswell,67 the Eighth Circuit took a bite out of
Fourth Amendment protections when it addressed a situation in which
neither of the involved parties had exclusive or mutual use of the premis-
es. 68 In its analysis, the court recognized that third party consent to
search has usually been given by persons who jointly occupy or possess
property. 69 The court further stated that a consent search is valid if it is
shown that permission to search was obtained from a third party who
possessed common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the
premises or effects sought to be inspected. 70
The difference in Baswell was that, literally, neither Baswell nor
Williams had "mutual use" of the premises. 7 1 The evidence merely
showed that Baswell was a close friend of the principle owner of the
65. Id. at 187. See also United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1955) (finding
magistrate-issued search warrants preferable over officer discretion).
66. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169.
67. 792 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1986).
68. United States v. Baswell, 792 F.2d 755, 758-59 (8th Cir. 1986). In this case, Baswell
appealed from a final judgment finding him guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Id.
at 756. Baswell argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence
seized pursuant to a warrantless search of a residence. Id.
The facts showed that Baswell had a key and free access to the vacation home partly owned by
his friend, Jack Bowie. Id. at 756-57. Bowie paid Bob Williams, who lived nearby,. to perform
maintenance and custodial work around the house. Id. at 757. As a result, Williams also had his own
key to the house. Id. On May 27, 1984, Baswell approached Williams and asked him to open the
house. Id. Williams did so, and subsequently observed Baswell hurriedly walking into the house
carrying a green bank pouch which he placed in the attic where he thought it would be hidden. Id.
Baswell then left the house and locked the door. Id.
Based on his observations, Williams entered and discovered three plastic bags containing a
white powder which he suspected to be cocaine. Id. Williams informed Drug Enforcement Agents
(DEA) that he was the caretaker of the vacation house and explained how and where he had located
the pouch. Id. Williams let the DEA officers into the house and showed them what he had
discovered. Id. Subsequent analysis of the seized powder revealed it was 83.1 grams, or about 2.9
ounces, of 64% pure cocaine. Id.
69. Baswell, 792 F.2d at 758. See, e.g., Marvin v. United States, 732 F.2d 669,675 (stating a third
party, a renter in a second floor bedroom, had authority to consent to a search of a portion of the
house not covered by the search warrant, but could not consent to seizure of records found in the
same area); United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that a deputy sheriff
had common authority over the sheriff's office in absence of any evidence mandating a contrary
inference). As a result, the rules concerning consent searches relate primarily to searches authorized
by a co-occupant. Baswell, 792 F.2d at 758.
70. Baswell, 792 F.2d at 758 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).
71. Id. at 759. This court had not previously decided how the Matlock rule applies when the third
party does not have "mutual use" and "joint control for most purposes." Id. at 758-59.
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house and that he had permission to stay in the house and freely use the
facilities.72 Williams, on the other hand, only had access to the house for
limited purposes. 73 In his capacity as a caretaker, he could only enter
the house to clean and repair at the owner's request. 74 Therefore,
Williams' consent was not based on his possession of common authority
as a joint occupant. 75 Nevertheless, relying on Stoner, the court deter-
mined that there was an implied agency relationship between Bowie and
Williams which validated Williams consent and the subsequent search.76
The effect of Baswell was to allow a person with no common
authority over the premises, to validate a search against another. The
only connection that Williams had to the house was in his capacity as
occasional caretaker. However, the court found this to be enough of a
relationship to allow Baswell to be convicted. From a defendant's point
of view, this relationship seems "strained" since no one with any perma-
nent connection to the premises was ever present to give consent.
7. The Floodgates Are Opened To A Reasonable Standard77
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of third party consent once
again in Illinois v. Rodriguez.78 In this case, the Court determined that a
warrantless entry is valid when it is based upon the consent of a third
party whom the police, at the time of entry, reasonably believed to
possess common authority over the premises, even though the third party
actually did not. 79
72. Id. at 759.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Baswiell, 792 F.2d at 759.
76. Id. The law of agency regarding consent searches was first introduced in Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1964) (recognizing that agents could consent to searches). See
supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (discussing Stoner).
77. The strength of the Fourth Amendment must "be judged against an objective standard:
[Wlould the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . 'warrant a [person] of reasonable caution
in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-22 (1968).
78. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
79. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990). In Rodriguez, the police were called to
the house of Dorothy Jackson on a matter concerning Dorothy's daughter, Ms. Gail Fischer. Id. at
179. Upon arrival, Ms. Fischer showed signs of a severe beating and told the officers that the
respondent, Edward Rodriguez, had assaulted her at an apartment earlier that day. Id. During the
conversation with the police, Ms. Fisher referred to the apartment as "their" apartment on several
occasions. Id. She also indicated that she had clothes and furniture at the apartment. Id.
After this discussion, Ms. Fischer consented to go to the apartment with the police. Id. The
police failed to get a search warrant since Ms. Fischer, who had previously lived with Rodriguez for
several months, admitted them into the apartment with her key. Id. at 180. Upon entry, the officers
viewed, in plain site, drug paraphernalia and containers filled with white powder later confirmed as
cocaine. Id. The officers seized the drugs and paraphernalia, and later arrested Rodriguez for
possession. Id. Rodriguez moved to suppress all evidence seized on the basis that Ms. Fischer had




Arriving at its decision, the Court referred to Matlock where it had
previously ruled that common authority relies on the mutual use of
property by people "generally having joint access or control for most
purposes." 80 On the basis of the record, the Court determined that Ms.
Fisher did not have mutual use or joint access to the property since she
had taken her children and moved from the apartment almost a month
before the search at issue, her name was not on the lease, she did not
contribute to the rent, she never invited friends to the apartment, and she
was never in the apartment when Rodriguez was away. 81 As a result, the
Court concluded that she did not have common authority over the
apartment .82
However, in its analysis, the Court entered new territory by defining
a reasonable standard which allowed an expansion in the area of third
party consent under the Fourth Amendment. 83 The Court noted that the
Fourth Amendment does not require that a defendant's consent be
present in order for the government to search the premises, but rather it
requires that no governmental search of a defendant's premises be
"unreasonable. 84
The Court went on to state that there are various elements which can
make a search of a person's house "reasonable." 85  One of these
elements exists when the individual who is being searched grants his or
her consent. 86 Another element occurs if a third party gives consent to a
search. 87 And now, even if the third party does not have common
authority over the premises, if an officer reasonably believes he or she
does, then the search will be valid. 88
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that its decision did not
imply that law enforcement officers could always accept a person's
invitation to enter a premises. 89 The Court reasoned that even when the
invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person lives
80. Id. at 181 (quoting United States v. Matlock,415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).
81. id.
82. Id. at 181-82.
83. Id. at 184-86.
84. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
85. Id. at 183-84.
86. Id. at 184. Three other exceptions which make a search valid include: the seizure of people
who have committed or are about to commit crimes, the presence of an authorized and valid warrant,
and a search which is incident to arrest. Id. at 184-85. For cases addressing these elements, see
collectively: Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (using a totality of circumstances test to
determine probable cause to arrest people who have committed or are about to commit crimes);
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987) (finding that the presence of a valid warrant will render
an unconsented search "reasonable"); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1971) (concluding that
a search incident to arrest may be reasonable even if the wrong person is mistakenly seized).
87. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 184.
88. Id. at 188-89.
89. Id. at 188.
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
there, the surrounding circumstances could be such that a reasonable
officer would not act upon them without further inquiry.90
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, failed to appreciate this conclu-
sion. 91 Justice Marshall stated that, in the past, the Court has tolerated
departures from the warrant requirement only when an exigent circum-
stance 92 has made a warrantless search imperative to ensure the safety of
both the police and the surrounding community. 93 In the absence of an
exigency, Justice Marshall contended that a warrantless home search and
seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 94 As a result,
Justice Marshall concluded that third party consent searches, under these
circumstances, are not based on exigency and therefore serve no com-
pelling social goal.95
Justice Marshall makes an important distinction, however, between
the third party consent discussed in this case and the third party consent
discussed in assumption of the risk cases.96 Under assumption of the
risk, third party consent limits a person's ability to challenge the reason-
ableness of the search only because that person voluntarily relinquished
some of his or her expectation of privacy by sharing access or control
over his or her property with another person. 97 However,"A search
conducted pursuant to an officer's reasonable, but mistaken, belief that a
third party had authority to consent [rests upon] entirely different
constitutional footing from one based on the consent of a third party
who in fact has such authority." 98
With this decision, the Court took a final bite from the already
devoured Fourth Amendment. Prior to Rodriguez, a consenting party
had to have at least some actual control over the premises to validate a
90. Id.
91. Id. at 189 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that "[b]ecause the sole law
enforcement purpose underlying third-party consent searches is avoiding the inconvenience of
securing a warrant, a departure from the warrant requirement is not justified simply because an
officer reasonably believes a third party has consented to a search of the defendant's home." Id. at
190.
92. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455-56 (1948) (defining exigent circumstances
as those which create a grave emergency). For other examples of exigent circumstances as
exceptions to the warrant requirement, see also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (finding
that a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant justifies a warrantless entry
of a burning building); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. 762-63 (1969) (ruling that an interest in
officers' safety justifies a search incident to arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967)
(allowing hot pursuit to be deemed an exigent circumstance).
93. Rodriguez,497 U.S. at 191.
94. Id. at 192.
95. Id. at 193.
96. Id. at 194.
97. Id.
98. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 194. Even if the officers reasonably believed that Ms. Fischer had




warrantless search. However, post Rodriguez, that requirement exists no
more. Now, a warrantless search can be validated by anyone as long as
the officer reasonably believes that the third party has the requisite
authority to grant consent. 99
8. Consent Standard Relaxed For Spousal Authority
In United States v. Duran,100 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the
Supreme Court's position in the area of third party consent when it
confronted the issue of spousal authority.' 0 ' In its analysis, the court
determined that, as a general matter, one spouse has the authority to
consent to a search of a premises jointly occupied by both spouses.102
The key in this case, however, revolved around the words "jointly
occupied" since Karen, the defendant's wife, had only minimal access to
the farmhouse where she consented to a search.1 03 Consequently, Cesar,
the defendant, argued that because all spouses do not share everything
with the other spouse, it is conceivable that one spouse may maintain
exclusive control over certain portions of a family homestead. 104
99. Id. at 188-89.
100. 957 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992).
101. United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1992). In Duran, Karen Duran, wife
of the appellant Cesar Duran, returned a pair of tennis shoes to a Foot Locker store in a mall because
she was unable to get them properly laced. Id. at 501. After explaining the situation to a Foot Locker
employee, Karen left the shoes to be laced and continued to shop in other stores in the mall. Id. While
lacing the shoes, the employee discovered three packages of what appeared to be marijuana in the
shoes, and called the police. Id. Two detectives of the Rock County Metro Unit examined the
packages, and subsequently determined that they contained marijuana. Id.
Later, when Karen returned to the store, the police were waiting to question her. Id. During
questioning, a consensual search of Karen's purse revealed $3,000 in cash, a small container of
cocaine, and some drug paraphernalia. Id. Karen was then arrested, taken to the police station, and
advised of her Miranda rights. Id. At that time, Karen admitted her willingness to talk and told the
officers that her husband, Cesar, sold large quantities of marijuana in the area. Id. Through the
encouragement of one of the detectives, Karen signed a consent form allowing a search of the Duran
residence, as well as several outbuildings and an old farmhouse on the property. Id. During the
search, the police discovered multiple weapons as well as 28 pounds of marijuana in the old
farmhouse. Id.
Based on the discovery of this evidence, Cesar was then arrested. Id. Subsequently, Cesar
filed a motion to suppress the seized marijuana on the basis that Karen's consent to the search of the
old farmhouse was defective. Id. On appeal, Cesar challenged the search on two grounds. first, he
contended that Karen's consent was involuntary, and second, he contended that Karen had neither
actual nor apparent authority to consent to a search of the old farmhouse. Id. at 501-02.
102. Id. at 503 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)). See, e.g., United
States v. Harrison, 679 F.2d 942, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (determining spouse's consent to search of
basement valid because she had full authority over that area); United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170,
173 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973) (determining spouse's consent over area which
both jointly occupied valid); WAYNm R. LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 8.4(a), at 275-76 (2d ed. 1987)
(stating the general principle of common authority allows a spouse to give valid consent to search all
or most of the jointly occupied premises).
103. Duran, 957 F.2d at 503-04.
104. Id. at 504. Cesar did not challenge the search of the Duran residence, which he and Karen
jointly occupied and shared common authority. Id. Rather, Cesar challenged Karen's authority to the
search of the old farmhouse, of which he claimed she had no joint access or control. Id. Cesar
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When considering the perimeters of this issue, the court refused to
enforce a per se rule which would incorporate every square inch of a
couple's property within the umbrella of common spousal authority. 05
The court bypassed the establishment of such a rule because, in the
spousal context, it might detach the third party consent rule from its
moorings since spouses do not surrender all privacies upon marriage.106
As a result, the court left open the possibility that one spouse could
maintain exclusive control over certain portions of the family home-
stead.107
Following this idea, the court focused on the Duran farmhouse to
determine whether Cesar had exclusive control over the structure. 108 In
so deciding, the court placed the burden on Cesar to rebut the presump-
tion of joint control, resulting from marriage, over the old farmhouse.109
According to the court, Cesar failed to carry this burden since the mere
fact that Karen neither used the old farmhouse nor left any of her
personal effects there, did not bear on whether Cesar maintained exclu-
sive dominion over the structure. 110 The court determined that one can
have access to a building or a room but choose not to enter.I 1 As a
result, the court concluded that Karen had actual authority which was
enough to make her consent to a search of the old farmhouse valid. 1 12
Although Duran seemed to give lip service to the idea that one
spouse could retain exclusive control over an area upon marriage, the
protection seems far from guaranteed.
informed the court that Karen believed the farmhouse was Cesar's private gym, she never entered or
used the farmhouse, and the police failed to find any of her clothing or personal belongings in the
farmhouse. Id.
105. Id. Establishing such a rule of common spousal authority may have advantages: obviating
the need to split hairs in discerning boundaries of authority over particular areas of a marital
homestead, providing police officers with more certainty and courts an easy rule to apply, and
reducing the chance of inconsistent outcomes. Id. Compare State v. Evans, 372 P.2d 365, 370-73
(Haw. 1962) (holding that a wife may not consent to a search of her husband's cuff link case which
was found in the top drawer of his dresser) with People v. Stacey, 317 N.E.2d 24, 27-28 (Ill. 197.4)
(allowing a wife to consent to a search of a dresser drawer where her husband kept his clothing).
106. Duran, 957 F.2d at 504. A per se rule is defective because it presumes that spouses, by
getting married, remove any and all boundaries between one another, Id. Although marriage may be
the most intimate of all human relations, a complete privacy surrender does not reflect reality, either in





11l. Duran, 957 F.2d at 505. Karen's belief that the old farmhouse was Cesar's private gym
carried greater weight because Cesar could have claimed she was denied assess to the structure. Id.
However, Karen's testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that she could have entered the




As previously stated, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
individual rights, and, as such, should protect every individual person,
not just those persons who choose to remain single.
The previous analysis of federal case law shows how limited Fourth
Amendment protections have become since their inception. What began
as a stringent standard requiring an individual to either waive Fourth
Amendment protections him or herself directly, or through an appropri-
ate agent, has extended to gambling an individual's rights by allowing
an officer's perceptions to determine the reasonableness of consent
under the Fourth Amendment.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA
Not unlike federal case law, this Note will also show that North
Dakota has followed the common authority approach as articulated by
Matlock, as well as the apparent authority approach as addressed in
Rodriguez.113 North Dakota has gone one step beyond Matlock and
Rodriguez, however, with its decision concerning a present, objecting
defendant and the Fourth Amendment. 1 4
In that instance, the North Dakota Supreme Court has ruled that
valid third party consent will override the most basic of doctrines; that
which allows a defendant currently on the premises, with exclusive
ownership rights, to speak and deny a search validated by another."l 5
However, the analysis of the present, objecting defendant can only be
understood after the North Dakota decisions concerning this subject
have been discussed.
1. Common Authority Doctrine
In State v. Swenningson,116 the court concluded "that a third party
may not consent to a search of the premises or effects under another
person's exclusive control."117 However, relying on Matlock, the court
113. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Matlock); see supra note 79 and
accompanying text (discussing Rodriguez).
114. See State v. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d 681,682 n.1 (N.D. 1987) (stating that "Marita's common
authority over Kunkel's bedroom gave her the right to allow the officers to enter, regardless of the
fact that Kunkel was present and objected to the officers' presence"). See also infra note 127 and
accompanying text (discussing a present, objecting defendant).
115. State v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d 171, 174 (N.D. 1995) (reaffirming Kunkel in light of a
present, objecting defendant). See also infra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing Kunkel).
116. 297 N.W.2d 405 (N.D. 1980).
117. State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405, 408 (N.D. 1980). During the course of a burglary
investigation, a juvenile informed the police that he and the defendant, Gerald Swenningson, had
committed the crime. Id. at 405. The juvenile further indicated that some of the stolen property was
still in Gerald's possession. Id. Based on this information, the police went to Gerald's home where
they were told by Gerald's sister to contact their father for permission to search the premises. Id. at
406.
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held that "a third party may consent, in his own right, to a search of an
area or effects over which parties have common authority." 118 As a
result, the defendant in Swenningson was unable to contest his father's
consent to a search of his bedroom since the court found that the defen-
dant lacked exclusive control over his room.11 9
Arriving at its decision, the court engaged in a discussion of the
Fourth Amendment and its prohibition against unreasonable searches. 120
This discussion relied on the reasoning set forth in State v. Matthews,121
which laid out three basic premises for determining the constitutionality
of a search.122 As indicated above, one of the three prongs in Matthews
allows for a search to be made without a warrant if it falls within one of
the exceptions to the warrant requirement.123 According to the court,
such an exception existed in Swenningson, which overrode Gerald's
claim that his father's consent was invalid.124
The result in Swenningson is no different from the result in
Matlock. In each instance, the separate courts determined that a person
possessing common authority over the premises may validate a search
against another who also shares the premises.125 This analysis rests upon
the previously discussed theory of assumption of the risk and is viewed
as an exception to the warrant requirement.
Gerald's father then gave written permission for the search, which revealed items from the
burglary in Gerald's bedroom. Id. Before trial, Gerald moved to suppress the incriminating evidence
discovered in his room claiming that his father's consent was -inadequate to waive his Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.
118. Id. at 408 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).
119. Id. at 408-09. The court determined that Gerald lacked exclusive control over his bedroom
since his father and sister both had access, he paid no rent, and the door to his room did not have a
lock. Id.
120. Id. at 406.
121. 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974).
122. State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90, 99 (N.D. 1974). The first premise is that "[aIll searches
made without a valid search warrant are unreasonable unless they are shown to come within one of
the exceptions to the rule that a search must be made upon a valid search warrant." Id. (citing State v.
Gajnor, 207 N.W.2d 260, 263 (N.D. 1973)). The second premise is that the "[sitate carries the burden
of proof on a motion to suppress where a violation of the Fourth Amendment is asserted." Id. The
third premise is that "[e]vidence obtained by search and seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment is,
by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, inadmissible in [s]tate [c]ourts."
Id. (citing State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91,98 (N.D. 1965)).
123. Id. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing a list of other exceptions).
124. State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405, 408 (N.D. 1980). A Fourth Amendment search is
properly conducted under the consent exception to the search warrant requirement. Id.
125. United States v. Matlock. 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); Swenningson. 297 N.W.2d at 407.
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However, in Swenningson, the court took its discussion beyond a mere
assumption of the risk theory when it stated in its opinion that this
common authority to consent may also be allowed in cases where the
defendant is present and objects to the search.126
2. Consent Overrides The Voice Of A Present Objector
The court further expounded upon the issue of a present, objecting
defendant in State v. Kunkel.127 In this case, the court relied on its prior
decision in Swenningson to determine that consent given by Kunkel's
mother, Marita, overrode the express objection of Kunkel himself who
attempted to limit the officers' intrusion in his own right.128 Although
Kunkel maintained that he had exclusive control over his room, 129 the
court denied this claim by determining that Marita had common authori-
126. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d at 407 (citing United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (relying on Matlock to determine that common authority consent overrides a present
defendant's objection); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977) (failing to
recognize the Appellant's initial refusal to consent as lessening the risk assumed that his co-occupant
would consent); but see Silva v. State, 344 So.2d 559, 562 (Fla. 1977) (stating that "[i]t is only
reasonable that the person whose property is the object of the search should have controlling authority
to refuse consent"); People v. Reynolds, 55 Cal. App.3d 357. 127 Cal.Rptr. 561, 568 (1976)
(determining that "if two co-tenants are present... and one gives the police permission to search and
the other refuses, it would appear reasonable to hold that the non-consenting co-occupant's right to
privacy should prevail to preclude a valid search."); People v. Mortimer, 46 A.D.2d 275, 361,
N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (1974) (stating that "the police may not undertake a warrantless search of
defendant's property after he has expressly denied his consent to such a search. Constitutional rights
may not be defeated by the expedient of soliciting several persons successively until the sought-after
consent is obtained.").
127. 406 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1987). In Kunkel, Werner Kunkel appealed from a jury verdict
finding him guilty of assault on a peace officer as a result of his mother's request to remove him from
his bedroom. State v. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d 681, 681 (N.D. 1987). Kunkel's mother, Marita. had
called the police after her son allegedly beat her in their home following an evening in celebration of
Kunkel's recent marriage. Id. at 682 n.2. Her allegation was substantiated by evidence of dried blood
on her face and clothes. Id. at 681. However, once the police arrived, Marita refused to sign a
complaint against her son and merely requested that he be removed from the premises. Id.
When asked where Kunkel was, Marita informed the officers that he was in his bedroom in the
basement. Id. Based on this information, the police went downstairs and knocked on Kunkel's door
but there was no response. Id. The officers then entered the room and observed Kunkel lying in bed.
Id. at 681-82. At that time, they informed Kunkel that he had to leave the premises. Id. Kunkel
responded to this request by telling the officers, quite explicitly, to leave his bedroom. Id. at 682. The
officers then informed Kunkel that he was not being arrested and that they would drive him anywhere
he wanted to go. Id.
After getting out of bed and beginning to dress, Kunkel asked the officers if he could drive his
own car. Id. The officers denied this request since they believed Kunkel was intoxicated. Id. As a
result, Kunkel attacked the officers. Id. After the encounter, the officers retreated upstairs where
they called Kunkel's parole officer to remove him from the premises. Id. Kunkel's parole officer
arrived and placed Kunkel into custody to be detoxified. Id.
128. Id. at 682 n.l (citing Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d at 407).
129. Id. at 682. Kunkel based this argument on the fact that he agreed to pay rent when he had
sufficient money, or in lieu of money he rendered services which created a landlord tenant situation.
Id. at 683. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961) (stating that a landlord could
not validly consent to the search of a house he had rented to another).
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ty over the premises, and therefore, the right to grant the officers en-
trance into her home.130
The court further stated that Marita's consent was valid regardless
of the fact that Kunkel was present and objected to the officers' pres-
ence. 131 Returning to Matlock, the court opined that a third party has
the right to permit entry in his or her own right and that a defendant has
assumed the risk that another cohabitant might permit others, including
the police, to enter the common area. 132 However, the court's reliance
on Matlock to conclude that the rights of a present, objecting, person can
be bypassed by a holder of common authority is misplaced. It is mis-
placed because the facts of Matlock do not involve a present, objecting
person since Matlock's arrest came prior to the issuance of consent
given by his girlfriend.133
Even conceding that Kunkel did not have exclusive control over his
room, he still had a voice. A voice that he chose to raise when the
officers entered his room and tried to remove him without a warrant. 134
Also conceding that Kunkel's mother had common authority over the
room, the Fourth Amendment should still allow a present, objecting
individual to limit the area to be searched.1 35 In response to this, the
court indicated that if the officers had sought to introduce physical
evidence which they acquired as a result of their entry, Kunkel could
have made a motion to have it suppressed.136
However, the issue in this case did not revolve around the seizure of
physical evidence. The issue considered the seizure of Kunkel, an
individual supposedly afforded the protections of the Fourth Amend-
130. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d at 683-84. The court established Marita's common authority by noting
that she owned the home, the basement door could only be locked from upstairs, and Marita had full
run of the home whether it was the basement or upstairs. Id. at 684.
131. Id. at 682 n.l. Notably, the court's entire holding was contained in a footnote which stated:
"Kunkel claims that even if Marita could have initially consented to the officers' entry, once he told
them to leave Marita's consent no longer was valid. This simply is not the law of our State."
Id. (citing State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405, 407 (N.D. 1980)). Even though the court clearly
stated that "this is not the law of our State," it failed to elaborate how it arrived at that conclusion.
132. Id. at 683 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 167, 168 (1974)).
133. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974). In Matlock, the arresting officers did
not ask Matlock which room he occupied or whether he would consent to a search, but were admitted
into the house with his estranged girlfriend's consent, and without a warrant. Id. See supra notes
60-66 and accompanying text (discussing Matlock). The Kunkel court also relied upon Swenningson in
its decision; however this is misplaced since Swenningson also failed to address a present, objecting
defendant. See supra notes 116-126 and accompanying text (discussing Swenningson). Both of these
cases differ from Kunkel in that Kunkel was present when the officers entered his room and he
objected to their warrantless intrusion at that time. State v. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d 681, 681-82 (N.D.
1987).
134. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d at 682.
135. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the limits and scope of consent).
136. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d at 682 n.3. The court further stated that "[i]f Kunkel believed the
police were acting improperly, he could have brought an action against the officers for an
infringement of his civil rights." Id.
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ment. 137 The court bypassed these protections when it -allowed Marita's
consent to be used as an exception to the warrant requirement.1 38 Such
an exception, as outlined in Matlock, did not take into account a present,
objecting individual. 139 Had the officers made an arrest, based upon
Marita's consent, then the seizure would have been permissible.1 40
However, Marita refused to have Kunkel arrested so this exception did
not apply.141
Through this decision, the court seemed to indicate that common
authority prevails not only over property, but also over people. There-
fore, this decision bars an individual from objecting to physical removal,
without a warrant, merely because it is determined that someone else has
common authority over that individual. This is yet another example of
the erosion of the Fourth Amendment.
3. Reasonableness Standard Adopted
Recently, in 1995, the North Dakota Supreme Court further limited
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment in State v.
Zimmerman.142 On appeal, the supreme court considered four ways in
137. Id. at 681-82.
138. Id. at 683.
139. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974)).
140. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1964) (allowing the police to confine the
defendant and search the area within the defendant's immediate control after a lawful arrest.)
141. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d at 681.
142. 529 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1995). In this case, the State appealed an order suppressing
evidence that the defendant, Michael Zimmerman, unlawfully possessed dead deer located in a
milking parlor on his farmstead. State v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d 171, 173 (N.D. 1995). The trial
court had ruled that there was no valid consent to search the Zimmerman farmstead based on the
confines of the warrant, and a lack of ownership in the property by Michael's father, Fabian, who
consented to a search of the milking parlor. Id. The supreme court reviewed the case to determine
whether Fabian had common authority over the premises and subsequently, whether he had the right to
consent to a search of the milking parlor. Id.
In Zimmerman, a North Dakota Game and Fish Department warden obtained a search warrant
for a steel building on the Michael Zimmerman farmstead. Id. The warrant stated that three illegally
possessed, untagged whitetail deer were believed to be hidden within the steel building. Id. Based on
this information, two wardens went to the Zimmerman farmstead and mistakenly served the warrant
on Michael's mother, Minerva. Id.
Minerva told the wardens that Michael did not live there, but resided in a trailer on the east end
of the farmstead. Id. Fabian and Minerva, Michael's parents, resided on the west end of the 120-acre
farmstead. Id. at 173. The steel building, and other dairy buildings, were located approximately fifty
yards from Fabian and Minerva's home. Id. What the wardens did not know, and failed to inquire
about, was that Fabian and Minerva had deeded the entire farmstead, excluding their home, to
Michael and his wife in 1993. Id.
Nonetheless, the wardens served the warrant on Minerva and searched the steel building. Id.
The deer were not found, but the wardens did discover blood, hair, tissue samples and rope for
carcass hanging. id. While the wardens were searching for evidence, Fabian approached and
directed them to the milking parlor where the deer were then located and seized. Id. After arrest,
Michael successfully suppressed the evidence since the milking parlor was outside the scope of the
warrant, and Fabian had no property right in the land. Id.
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which a search of the milking parlor could be found reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment: first, the search warrant could have covered the
building where the deer were discovered; second, Michael, the defendant,
could have consented to the search; third, Fabian, the defendant's father,
could have had actual common authority over the milking parlor; and
fourth, the wardens could have reasonably believed Fabian had common
authority over the milking parlor.143 Since the court determined that the
first two reasons were invalid, it focused on the third and fourth in order
to validate the search.144
The court began with the third reason by analyzing whether Fabian
possessed common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the
milking parlor.145 The court reiterated that such common authority
involves joint access or control and is not limited to ownership of the
premises.146 However, the court determined that even though Fabian led
the wardens to the deer without request, he did not own the milking
parlor, he was not involved in the dairy operation, and he derived no
income from it.147 As a result, Fabian lacked common authority over the
milking parlor.148
The court then focused on the fourth reason to determine whether it
was reasonable for the wardens to believe that Fabian had sufficient
authority over, or relationship to, the milking parlor to consent to their
entry.149 The court relied on federal case law to determine that the
Fourth Amendment is not violated when law enforcement officers
receive consent to search from a third party who does not actually have
common authority over the property but where reliance on the consent is
reasonable. 150
Based on this standard, the court concluded that the wardens had
good reason to believe Fabian had common authority over the farm-
stead.151 This resulted from the fact that the wardens were presented with
143. Id. at 174.
144. Id. The search was not reasonable based on the first reason because the search warrant
covered the steel building and not the milking parlor. Id. The second reason failed as well because
Michael had not consented to a search of the milking parlor. Id.
145. Id. (citing State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405,407 (N.D. 1980)).
146. Id. (citing Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d at 407) (stating that common authority is not to be
implied from the mere property interest of a third party. The authority which justifies third party
consent does not rest on the law of property, with its historical and legal refinements, but rests on
mutual use of the property by people generally having joint access or control for most purposes)
(quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7).
147. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d at 175.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 174-75 (citing State v. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d 681, 683 (N.D. 1987)).
150. Id. at 175 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)). In Rodriguez the court
based this conclusion on the reasonableness of the officers' belief that their actions in executing the
search were merited. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177. 186 (1990).
151. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d at 175.
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a typical family farm. 152 Therefore, the court considered it plausible for
the wardens to conclude that Fabian, as the perceived head of the family
farm, would have authority over the premises.153 Consequently, the
court found the facts supported a finding of apparent authority.154
As a result, the determination of consent to enter is now judged
against an objective standard which considers whether the facts available
to the officer would warrant reasonable caution in the belief that the
consenting party had authority over the premises.155 If the officer does
not believe that such authority exists, then warrantless entry without
further inquiry is unlawful.1 56 However, if the officer reasonably be-
lieves that authority does exist, then the search is valid.157 In other
words, the officer's perspective will prevail.158
In deciding Zimmerman, the court simply followed what the United
States Supreme Court articulated in Rodriguez.159 However, in Rodri-
guez there were physical signs of a violent act that initially led police to
Rodriguez's apartment.1 60  No similar facts were present in
Zimmerman.161 Furthermore, it does not seem "reasonable" for a law
enforcement officer to serve a warrant on the wrong person, and then
when told of the mistake, to rely instead on the consent of a third party
to validate the search.162 However, that is exactly what occurred in
Zimmerman, and that is where the law in North Dakota currently re-
mains. 163
With each subsequent ruling, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
further diminished individual rights under the Fourth Amendment.
While Kunkel relied upon the doctrine of common authority to prevail
and Zimmerman focused on the standard of reasonableness to define
consent, Swenningson entered unfamiliar territory by incorporating a
152. Id. at 176. The farm was typical in that the home and farm buildings were within 50 yards
of each other, the son and wife lived on the land only a short distance away, and the farm buildings
were located between the two homes. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 175 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1,21-22 (1968))).
156. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d at 175 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990)).
157. Id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189 (1990)).
158. Id.
159. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (finding that a determination of consent to
enter must be judged against an objective standard).
160. Id. at 179.
161. State v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d 171. 173 (N.D. 1995).
162. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (disallowing a voluntary consent search that was
acted upon after officers informed the party that they had a valid warrant).
163. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d at 175 (concluding that the wardens acted reasonably in relying
upon Fabian's common authority to permit entrance).
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rule which silenced a present, objecting defendant from protecting his
rights.
III. RAMIFICATIONS
The effect of the decisions discussed in this Note, both in federal
and North Dakota case law, has been to gradually limit the explicit
guarantees provided by the Fourth Amendment. In earlier cases, the
Fourth Amendment required the direct consent of the party involved to
give validity to a search.164 Over the course of time, however, the initial
agency doctrine has been expanded to include: a property theory,
assumption of the risk, voluntary consent, common authority, and
apparent authority doctrines, 165 all of which now constitute valid ways
around the warrant requirement.
With this gradual erosion, the Fourth Amendment has become a
mere script to be rewritten and conformed to the convenience of law
enforcement officials who cannot be burdened with obtaining a warrant
prior to a search. As a result, an individual no longer has the right to
seek protection from the Fourth Amendment if an officer finds it
reasonable, under the Rodriguez standard, to rely upon a consenting
party who has granted permission to search in the defendant's absence.
Furthermore, North Dakota has gone one step further by denying a
present, objecting individual to be heard if a third party gives valid
consent either prior to, or following the objection.1 66 Consequently, as
the Fourth Amendment is further eaten away, what was once great
history, appears to be becoming history itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
The most immediate concern of this author is the gradual erosion of
the Fourth Amendment, and where that erosion will ultimately end. In
the area of consent to warrantless searches, the United States Supreme
164. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964). Such consent came directly from the
individual or from an authorized agent. Id.
165. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.1l (1968) (finding a homeowner's
consent to a search of the home is binding on all members of the household); Frazier v. Cupp., 394
U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (concluding that property owner who had left possession of property with a
friend assumed the risk that the friend would consent to a search of the property); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (determining that consent validates a warrantless search if the
subject of the search gave consent voluntarily); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)
(declaring that consent by one with common authority is binding even on nonconsenting persons who
share in the authority); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (concluding that law
enforcement personnel must consider all circumstances when relying upon apparent authority consent
to enter).
166. See State v. Kunkel, 406 N.W.2d 681, 682 n.1 (N.D. 1987) (stating that Kunkel's objection
to entry was not binding in light of a third party's prior valid consent).
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Court has moved further and further away from the original purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, which was to protect individual rights. Unfortu-
nately, the North Dakota Supreme Court has followed suit, and has
added to this erosion.
In the beginning, the authors of the Fourth Amendment proposed
its adoption to establish protection against the evils of the general
warrant which allowed British officials to search anywhere they desired
limited only by their own discretion. By ratifying the Fourth Amend-
ment, the United States sought to eliminate the fear of such unrestricted
searches. However, as time has progressed, the Fourth Amendment has
undergone substantial change through exceptions and limitations.
Ironically enough, the standard now followed by the United States
Supreme Court in Rodriguez and by the North Dakota Supreme Court in
Zimmerman, validates a search based solely on the reasonable discretion
of the officer involved. Although this discretion is not unlimited, as it
was in England, the similarities are frightening. Perhaps there is truth in
the saying that history repeats itself.
Nancy J. Kloster
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